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Framing Opposition to Nuclear Power:  
The Case of Akkuyu in Southeast Turkey
Pinar Temocin
Following the 2010 nuclear deal between Russia and Turkey, several consequent 
revelations of administrative deficiencies in the Turkish nuclear program, the 
Fukushima accident, and waste issues all spurted widespread protests across Turkey. 
This study analyzes how groups opposing nuclear power plants have framed the 
Akkuyu nuclear project as a dangerous, risky, disadvantageous, and irrational policy 
choice. Through analysis of empirical data from a range of sources such as in situ 
observation, semi-structured interviews, articles, and websites, the study considers 
the core issues raised and arguments given by the opponents.
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Introduction
One of the most important transformative actions planned by the current 
government of Turkey since the 2002 victory of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) formed by Recep Tayyip Erdogan is a renewed emphasis on nuclear 
projects. Among these is the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (NPP) in the southern 
province of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast of Turkey. The site had been 
selected as far back as 1976, but no work was done, and the project was cancelled 
due to the lack of sufficient resources in 2000. An agreement in 2010 between the 
Turkish government and Russia’s largest electricity generating company, Rosatom, 
allowed the project to resume. Construction was formally launched in 2015 and 
effectively began in 2018.
The 2010 agreement was elaborated and emphatically presented in 2010 by 
the then Prime Minister (now President) Erdogan in the context of the “2023 
vision,” which is full of goals for the prosperity and economic independence of 
Turkey. The agreement with Russia, however, has led to intense conflicts and 
protests, and this issue has polarized the supporters (energy policy makers, 
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local investors, and experts and engineers involved with the project) and the 
opponents (activists from environmental organizations, civilians, associations, 
municipalities, and unions), and has created an intense debate. While the Turkish 
government persistently maintains the plausibility of the project, there have 
been a considerable number of disputes over its underlying feasibility caused by 
technological, political, economic, and management problems. This has resulted 
in the undermining of its legitimacy and growing public opposition to nuclear 
development.
In practice, opposition to Turkey’s first nuclear power plant has been framed 
in a number of different ways since 2010, of which the following are the most 
important: (1) an approach based on risk factors with a “what-if ” perspective 
which hints at the probabilities in the event of an accident; (2) a grievance-
oriented approach, which is homogeneously and innately embedded in the 
specific characteristics of the project; (3) a political dimension which emerges due 
to the Turkish government’s economic and development discourses regardless of 
the majority’s consent; (4) consequence-driven concerns which have been revived 
after Fukushima with its interpretation for the Turkish case; and (5) alternative-
focused claims which are shaped by a “why-not” perspective that highlights other 
energy production alternatives.
This article analyzes these diverse opposition arguments. The accumulation 
and interaction of these claims can shed light on civil society motivations and 
preferences concerning the energy-policy making culture. Their very diversity, 
however, points to a potential difficulty in coordinating the messages and actions 
of opposition groups.
Method and Theory
This study provides an overview of the origins and strategies of Turkey’s anti-
nuclear activism. It does not seek an objective assessment of the factual bases of 
their positions, but rather analyzes their choices in how to represent the problem 
and what solutions to seek. It focuses throughout on “how” instead of “why,” 
and analyzes the link between synchronous variables and a longer-term socio-
historical perspective in shaping the strategy of anti-nuclear groups. Looking to 
the contemporary period, I ask: “how are the existing arguments given by anti-
nuclear movement formed and sustained,” and “how are the objects, subjects, 
and actions of the anti-nuclear groups constructed.” In a longer-term perspective, 
the questions become “what are the characteristics of the Akkuyu project that 
made opponents particularly anxious about it,” and “how can we explain the 
phenomenal rebirth of anti-nuclear activism with several distinct arguments in 
a specific timeframe (2010-2015).” In both cases, the focus of the study is the 
subjective representations of the problem and its possible solutions produced by 
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the activist groups themselves.
While there is little written in the scientific literature pertaining to the 
Akkuyu project, there is an enormous amount of primary material written by the 
advocacy groups consisting of reports, articles, opinion pieces, social media posts, 
and blogs, etc., available at present. This study is based on these primary materials 
both in Turkish and English. Empirical data was accordingly collected from a 
range of sources: in situ observation, semi-structured interviews (N=18) lasting 
from thirty minutes to one hour with activists and representatives of anti-nuclear 
groups, newspaper articles, websites, blogs written by activists, NGO reports 
and statements, and ethnographic research in the village where the Akkuyu NPP 
is located. The face-to-face interviews were conducted in Akkuyu, Mersin, and 
Istanbul in February-March 2016; others were conducted via email, Skype, and 
social networks. The overall material is supplemented by secondary literature 
both on anti-nuclear activism and on the role of civil society groups in politics 
more generally. 
The interpretation of this material rests first of all on the method of frame 
analysis, focusing on the intentional ways in which activists construct their 
self-presentations, interpretations, and counterarguments toward a specific 
social problem in order to receive attention and support from others. This is 
complemented by the theory of political opportunity structures to provide an 
understanding of the existing conditions, settings, and actions that determine 
a social movement’s characteristics and trajectory. This helps understand the 
relationship between collective protests and political systems, prevalent demand, 
and institutional responses (providing avenues and tolerance to movements). 
A useful starting point for understanding the diverse strategies of anti-
nuclear groups is Schön and Rein’s (1994) discussion of “framing.” According 
to these authors, intractable policy controversies are often characterized by the 
presence of antagonistic actors who struggle to legitimate their actions and ideas 
through gaining control over the definition of policy objects in order to shape 
actions for their own benefit. “Elements” are selected for attention to construct a 
specific “problem” out of a complex reality or vague situation (ibid., 26). Framing 
policies are based on conflictual dialogues for designing a policy; thus, actors 
are considered as policy-designers seeking to transform policy objects, solve 
problems, resolve dilemmas, or exploit existing opportunities in order to bring 
about desirable consequences (design rationality). Applying this perspective 
to social movements, we can see that anti-nuclear organizations and actors in 
movements try to frame the main problem so that it can be solved through 
advantageous strategies.
When it comes to addressing global challenges, framing is critical for public 
understanding so that they can build consensus, participate in in mobilizations, 
and form trust in activist agendas. If the framing of a particular issue succeeds in 
addressing existing conditions, it can influence public opinion and eventually lead 
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to government actions coherent with activist demands. For this reason, Snow and 
Benford (2000) argue that the struggle over the production of ideas and meanings 
is essential. Attributing a meaning to collective actions, expressing grievances 
or the issue at stake in line with its level, and sharing a common identity (based 
on a “we” and “our” approach) as part of the component of collective motivation 
are important elements in framing complex issues such as opposition to nuclear 
development.  
In order to provide a broader description of how “anti-nuclear activism” is 
framed and structured by groups, we need to analyze the way they act toward 
this issue. Guigni (1998) argues that social movements, particularly when they 
express themselves through their most typical forms of action (such as public 
demonstrations, protests, and lobbying) address their message simultaneously to 
two distinct targets, power holders and the general public, as message receivers. 
They press the political authorities in order to be recognized as well as to get 
their demands met. In other words, they seek support and try to sensitize the 
population to their cause (ibid., 26). In this sense, their arguments for meeting 
their demands are significant elements. According to Pianta, Ellersiek, and Utting 
(2012), who research the dynamics of activism on global issues in Europe and 
its impact on policies, political opportunities as well as “internal” dimensions of 
activist organizations and networks are related to issue framing which is based 
on public understanding and perception; the building of consensus, with the 
support of public opinion as well as public participation in mobilizations; and 
the legitimation and recognition of activists’ role in social issues. Furthermore, 
a desired change can happen when strong and feasible demands find political 
space with the support of multiple actions at multiple levels (ibid., 524). Thus, 
it is important to see the interaction between civil society organizations and 
the nuclear policy making-process. In this sense, framing is helpful to shape 
discourses and portray causes of social movements appeal to a wide audience.
The evidence presented in this article makes it clear that, even for activists 
who are on the same side of an issue, in this case opposed to construction of the 
Akkuyu NPP, the key elements of the situation can be framed quite differently. 
This observation fits well with observations of other scholars. McCarthy and Zald 
(1977) suggest that there is always enough discontent in any society to supply 
grassroots support for a movement when it is effectively organized. Therefore, 
major catastrophes function as a “suddenly imposed grievance” that can generate 
immediate protests and mobilization (Walsh 1981). In this case, framing is thus 
provided by an outside event. By itself, however, this cannot explain the variety 
of strategies observed. Even in a case such as the Chernobyl accident, definitions 
and interpretations differed widely from one setting to another (Koopman and 
Duyvendak 1995, 241). For these authors, the explanation for protest behavior 
lies in the accumulated presence of intolerable circumstances, unbearable 
deprivations, and intense grievances. Catastrophes, in this argument, interact 
 Framing Opposition to Nuclear Power 357
with context; even following a discrete event such as the Chernobyl accident, 
different settings, claims, and political contexts (such as governmental support 
and skepticism over the nuclear future) play an important role in framing the 
“problem” (ibid., 237). In this regard, the work of Martin (2007) expands the 
explanation of strategic actions based on the negative overall image of nuclear 
energy produced by its opponents. 
Bringing these approaches together, it is clear that while arguments made 
by anti-nuclear groups are likely to combine reference to specific events such as 
reactor accidents with longer-term issues (disposal of high-level waste, cancers 
from radon released by uranium tailings, increased risk of terrorism, promotion 
of a regional nuclear arms race, and economic subsidies for nuclear power, etc.) 
and the way in which any given group does this will depend on elements beyond 
the nuclear issue itself. The notion of a political opportunity structure helps 
us understand why this is so. In this context, Tilly (1998, 496) points out that 
intrinsic elements of social movements can be claimed (by sympathizers) as the 
presence of solidarity, the construction of shared identities, the sense of common 
grievance, the creation of sustainable organizations, and more. In this logic, 
collective protest occurs when activists blame the political or economic system 
in place for the problems they denounce, believing that an opportunity to bring 
about change exists when protests take place (Della Porta and Diani 2006, 18). 
In this way, the openness and accountability of political systems play a role not 
only in the success or failure of any movement but also in the tactics they employ. 
For Kitschelt (1986), the role of the national political structure is essential for 
movements’ strategic choices and outcomes. In this line, “the openness of a 
political regime to new demands” plays a substantial role.
Between them, framing and opportunity structures provide analytical tools 
for understanding the differences between the messages and strategies of the 
various anti-nuclear groups in Turkey. While the first encourages us to look at 
how each of them defines the problem to be addressed, the second helps us to 
understand why some solutions and strategies are given priority.
State and Society in Contemporary Turkey
Before looking at the specific issues raised by anti-nuclear activists, it is important 
to take into account two elements of context: the place of the Akkuyu project in 
the Turkish government’s larger plans for economic and political development, 
and the background for social activism in contemporary Turkey.
The Akkuyu project is presented by the Turkish government as part of 
a broader program for Turkey’s economic development. The “2023 vision,” 
marking the centenary of the proclamation of the Turkish republic, has been 
put forward by the government as a comprehensive vision for the long-term 
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renovation of Turkey’s place in the world, in terms of economy, technology, as 
well as infrastructure for communication, transport, tourism, and energy. In the 
name of a “New Modern Turkey,” the program aims to achieve some particular 
targets with mega-projects such as the world’s busiest airport and intercontinental 
bridges in order to become one of the ten most powerful countries. The Akkuyu 
nuclear project as part of this aim is strategically planned to begin operation 
in 2023 with the intention of symbolizing Turkey’s nuclear industry, economic 
power, and technology capability. Beyond its symbolism, the project is justified by 
the government in the context of eliminating energy dependency and diversifying 
energy generation to contribute to the aim for economic growth. 
Somewhat ironically in light of the government’s rhetoric of independence, 
the Akkuyu project is made possible by the support of a foreign partner, the 
2010 contract with Rosatom. According to this deal, the Akkuyu NPP will be 
built, owned, and operated by Russia. According to the Nuclear Energy Project 
Implementation Department, the logic for the agreement with Russia is based 
on its nuclear capacity and technology. Russia has been generating electricity 
through NPPs since the 1950s. Furthermore, Turkey seems to rely on Russia 
and Rosatom’s reputation on the global market for the ongoing construction 
of NPPs in other countries. In return, Russia’s stake in the project is at least 51 
percent according to the agreement, with the remaining shares available for sale 
to outside investors. This opens a door to Turkish and international investors 
and companies and can be seen as part of a broader effort by the government to 
attract international capital. 
Relations between the state and civil society in Turkey have varied 
considerably over the last decade. The government initially took important steps 
towards democratization and liberalization of the economy after gaining the 
majority in the 2002 election in order to improve the climate for accession to the 
European Union (EU). It provided a space for state-civil society relations and 
organizations (Ozcetin and Ozer 2015). The state-civil society dialogue became 
restricted, however, after the political awakening of civil society over the Gezi 
Park protests in the second half of 2013. Since then, there has been growing 
miscommunication between Turkish civil society and the current state which 
rejects the legitimacy of protests and increasingly has suppressed them with 
force. The newly created disparity resonates in almost all spheres of civic activities 
including those made by anti-Akkuyu project groups.
Opposing the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant
The nationwide anti-nuclear movement began in the mid 1970’s and gained 
strength after events such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident and the energy 
project with Russia. It consists of organizations, individuals, and independent 
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activists, including unions, associations, municipalities, members of political 
parties, environmentalist non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ecologist 
initiatives, left-wing movements, journalists, celebrities, nuclear engineers, 
intellectuals, and academics. The anti-nuclear movement rejects the idea that 
nuclear energy is reliable, clean, or affordable, a position consistently defended by 
the ruling party’s representatives. Organizations such as Nukleer Karsiti Platfom 
(with a broad alliance of diverse groups that bring together over 100 components 
such as NGOs, labor and trade unions, trade associations, and chambers), 
Greenpeace Mediterranean (as a recognized transitional organization which 
advocates for the end of the nuclear age by means of phasing out existing reactors 
and rejecting any new construction of commercial nuclear reactors, as well as 
stopping international trade in nuclear technologies and materials), and sub-
groups of The Greens have fought against Turkey’s nuclear aspirations and taken 
action together and separately to tackle this issue with deepening objections. 
Others include Kuresel Eylem Grubu (Global Action Group), which is based 
on collective activism on ecology, more specifically global warming and nuclear 
energy, and Nukleersiz.org, which is an online project initiated by eminent 
activists.
To achieve their demands and gain recognition, social movement actors have 
pressured national and local governments through press statements, signature 
campaigns, and petitions, etc. Governmental officials and investors, on the other 
hand, seem determined to build the NPP and are certain about its technological 
safety systems. As these groups have been playing an antagonist role in the 
process of nuclearizing Turkey, they have called on the government to renounce 
their attempt to build the first NPP (and potential future plants) and demanded 
possible safer sustainable alternatives. However, the government seems to be 
sticking to their nuclear agenda despite the intensifying nuclear debate since 
2010. There are several contested factors in having an “anti-nuclear” approach 
when considering the devastating effects of any nuclear power in the world. But 
for the Akkuyu nuclear project, the most relevant factors are based mainly on the 
nature of the project itself. 
Risk-Based Explanations
Anti-nuclear groups anywhere in the world discuss the risks of an accident in 
terms of environment, health, safety, and security with respect to past nuclear 
tragedies or potential ones (Martin 2007, 45). With respect to the Akkuyu project, 
safety and security related concerns have resonated the most in terms of riskiness 
of the project.
One of the major catalysts of the movement against the Akkuyu NPP relates 
to safety and security precautions. The nuclear industry’s security program is 
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regulated by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK), which is responsible 
for the adequacy of Akkuyu’s security system (TAEK 2012). Despite this, anti-
nuclear groups have raised questions on nuclear security since the beginning of 
the agreement in the context both of natural disasters and human attack. The 
concerns that have been raised in this context are discussed here.
Seismic Risks
The argument given by the pro-nuclear side just after the Fukushima disaster 
has been based on the facts that it was an old plant and the earthquakes and 
tsunamis of the sort that occurred in Fukushima or anywhere in Japan are 
much less common in Turkey. Even so, scientific findings demonstrate that an 
earthquake can destroy the whole project as Akkuyu is located in an earthquake-
prone area. Correspondingly, Greenpeace claims that the Ecemiş fault line is 
situated just 25 km away from the Akkuyu NPP site (Greenpeace 2011). Turkey is 
also considered one of the most seismically active regions in the world (Nuclear 
Power Daily 2009). When considering seismic hazards analyses and technical 
evaluations of the project, building a nuclear reactor next to the Ecemiş fault zone 
where seismic activity could increase the risk of an accident that could affect the 
entirety of Southern Turkey, Cyprus, and the Middle East is not acceptable for the 
opponents of the project.
Potential Terrorist Activities
Physical security of NPPs and their vulnerability to deliberate acts of terrorism 
was elevated to a security concern following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001 (Holt and Andrews 2014). Therefore, the relationship between the real 
and imagined risks should be taken into consideration when studying possible 
nuclear terrorism or military attack. A successful attack on the Akkuyu NPP 
could have devastating consequences in light of its geopolitical position in the 
region. How will the region defend itself given the possibility that an air attack 
might penetrate the Akkuyu plant when considering that Turkey’s nuclear 
partner Russia is a growing power in the Middle East? The question on “how will 
the Turkish authorities protect civilians’ to right to life, public safety, and national 
security” is framed by engineers from anti-nuclear groups. 
Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons
The close relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons provides an 
additional element in framing the problem. In this context, opposition to the 
Akkuyu plant is based on being the first step on a path toward nuclear weapons, 
as it is believed that nuclear power increases the risk of nuclear proliferation due 
to the production of raw nuclear material (Udum 2010, 204). The possibility 
of the dissemination of nuclear weapons in the Middle East has been raised by 
the anti-nuclear physicists affiliated with anti-nuclear groups which argue that 
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any country that has nuclear power has the potential to make nuclear weapons 
(Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 2006).
Turkey does not have its own nuclear weapons. However, the country hosts 
more than sixty American nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Force Base (EDAM 
2012, 4). As the Akkuyu NPP is planned to be constructed very close to Incirlik, 
the question of whether or not the Akkuyu NPP would create a new “Incirlik 
Base” for Russia is unavoidable considering that Rosatom owns nuclear weapons 
and that Russia has security interests in Syria, South Cyprus, and Israel. Moreover, 
the Russian-designed Akkuyu NPP will be the first and only plant in a state’s 
sovereign territory that is owned and operated by another state. Giving such 
priority to Russia creates anger beyond the core of anti-nuclear groups because of 
fears that Turkey’s dependency will increase and Russia will become autonomous 
via Akkuyu, like America’s Incirlik Airbase in Adana. It could also be argued 
that Russia is trying to augment its nuclear energy programs in the Middle East 
to neutralize the influence of the United States in this region (Trenin 2016). As a 
consequence, one line of anti-nuclear arguments made by one of the most well-
known electrical engineers from Nukleersiz.org, Arif Kunar, focusses on the 
claim that Turkey has been picked as a guinea pig for this role in the strategy-
based game (Interview, Arif Kunar, July 12, 2016). In this way, and in the context 
of the Iranian nuclear program, the principal risk is of a regional nuclear arms 
race, which would also decrease future security for the region. When considering 
that Turkey might be ready to have its own nuclear weapons through using the 
material from an NPP, which is also not far from Incirlik and Iran, the risk of a 
nuclear arms race becomes a powerful frame for anti-nuclear activism.
No Trust in Rosatom
For Akkuyu, one of the main questions over security and safety issues creating 
dissonance is based on the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom. 
Since the company belongs to the same group as the builders of the Chernobyl 
reactor, Rosatom itself is seen as a risk factor for the Akkuyu project. The 
concerns over Rosatom are based on its bad image after Chernobyl, its use of 
obsolete technology, especially the reactor type chosen for Turkey (VVER-1200), 
doubt about Rosatom’s technical competence, and the skills of their technical 
staff. There are further concerns about Russia’s domination in the Middle East.
Rosatom has set the agenda of building four VVER-1200 nuclear reactors, 
but has never reviewed nor assessed the license application (Yeşil Gazete 2015). 
Hence, TAEK is finding it difficult to procure technical support services. 
The questions over the reactor type include whether or not it will succeed as 
a new reactor. Turkey will also not have the authority to review the design. 
Moreover, with questions over low-quality materials, human resources capacity, 
and insufficient information, the company itself is a problematic issue for the 
opponents of the project. According to the agreement, Rosatom is responsible 
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for engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the plant. A 
Greenpeace Hungary (2014) report emphasizes that Rosatom is continuing to 
operate Soviet-era reactors despite the demonstrated failure of Chernobyl, even 
though the company claims that they have improved the safety of their reactors. 
According to the report, concerns raised by the anti-nuclear movements around 
the world are based on quality control. In the anti-nuclear consensus, safety risks 
raise a serious question as to whether it would be plausible to approve Rosatom’s 
ambition in owning and operating an NPP in Turkey, which has no experience in 
nuclear energy nor a sophisticated nuclear safety culture. 
In addition to safety issues in the legacy of Chernobyl, the Russian nuclear 
industry does not have a good reputation in the eyes of opponents because of 
corruption. The question of “how sure can we be about Turkey in this sense 
after all of the scandals involving Rosatom” lies at the center of concerns about 
Rosatom, which is facing charges of corruption, fraud, and supplying cheap 
nuclear materials (Digges 2013). 
For all these reasons, anti-nuclear groups blame Turkish nuclear decision-
makers for making an agreement with Russia without learning from history. A 
“build-own-operate” nuclear project, which is the model being discussed with 
Russia, would be a disastrous choice for Turkey in their view. The Russian nuclear 
industry and regulatory authority lack transparency. According to engineering 
experts watchdogging the Akkuyu project since the beginning, they have neither 
the capacity nor the willingness to enforce the rules and regulations set out in 
their own nuclear safety codes (Interview, Hayrettin Kilic, April 16, 2016).
Grievance-Oriented Explanation of Opposition to the Akkuyu 
Project
Distinct from questions of technical or political risk are direct grievances linked 
to the normal operation of the plant. Here the focus is on the project’s overall cost, 
lack of waste management, and problems in administration. These grievances are 
emphasized by the anti-nuclear groups in defense of their claim that the project 
as a whole is not acceptable.
Cost and Economic Irrationality
Another important issue with nuclear plants is the question of financial cost. The 
total installation of the Akkuyu NPP is estimated at $20 billion. Electricity will be 
produced by Rosatom. After the completion, the company will sell electricity to 
Turkey at a fixed price of $USD 12.35 cents per kWh in the first fifteen years after 
the NPP starts operating. It is assumed that this price will pay back the investment 
expenditures of Rosatom in the given time (World Nuclear Association 2018). 
The opponents of the project claim that it is an exceptional deal with Russia due 
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to the amount. In one of the most popular Turkish newspapers, columnist Yalçın 
Doğan (2015) indicated that “in Western countries, a kWh of electricity produced 
in NPPs costs between 4 and 4.5 cents; however, in Akkuyu, it will be 12.35 cents. 
It is the most expensive electricity in the world after Japan.” It is true that the 
price will be costly for prospective electricity consumers in Turkey. Looking at 
France (8.97 cents) and the United States (9.43 cents) we see that their national 
electricity prices in 2015 were below than estimated electricity price for Akkuyu 
(Statistic Portal 2015). Adding to the installation cost, electricity price is expected 
to be very high when producing electricity.
Furthermore, when also looking at renewable energy sources as attractive 
alternatives in the eyes of opponents, wind and solar energies are less costly than 
nuclear power (DeRosa 2015). Considering that there are no economic benefits 
from the Akkuyu project, the ambition for the project sounds economically 
irrational as well as controversial. Accordingly, a central claim made by the anti-
nuclear groups is that a nuclear reactor in Akkuyu will not benefit Turkey. Rather 
it will produce profits for Russia but will increase electricity prices in Turkey 
while increasingly binding Turkey to Russia.
Lack of Appropriate Management: Waste Disposal
Radioactive waste management is one of the most crucial issues for any country 
employing nuclear energy. The case of Akkuyu differs from the conventional 
discourses. The discovery of radioactive and toxic waste buried in western Turkey 
(in Gaziemir, Izmir) in 2012 revealed the neglect of the TAEK’s energy approach. 
The Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, the Izmir Municipality, and 
the Gaziemir District Governor’s Office knew about the radioactivity and none 
of the agencies took any steps to punish anyone for negligence. Although this 
is a fundamental element of managing any nuclear project, the Environmental 
Assessment Report does not contain any information about managing and 
disposing nuclear waste (Atici 2015). It matters for the anti-nuclear groups that 
even this vital report for the project keeps the “waste issue” secrect. This has 
embroiled the project in juridical struggles.
Furthermore, it has been argued by environmental activists that having 
nuclear waste without having an NPP reveals the officials approached this issue 
apathetically. One possibility is that nuclear waste is being imported illegally into 
Turkey by foreign companies who also operate nuclear plants. In any case, the 
discovery of radioactive waste buried at an abandoned factory brought additional 
and specific attention to this issue.
Lack of Appropriate Administration: ÇED report
An Environmental Impact Assessment Report (a.k.a. ÇED) is required in Turkey 
for all projects of this kind. Rosatom applied to receive ÇED approval for Akkuyu. 
However, only ten days were given to the public to review the contents and details 
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of the report totaling 3,500 pages. The report was immediately approved by the 
Ministry of Environment and Urbanization in December 2014. As analyzed by 
Demircan (2015), this report was approved both hastily and carelessly with no 
public participation in a non-transparent process. There was backlash for the 
trivialization of such an environmental issue and, thus, environmental activists 
and anti-nuclear lawyers revealed, on online platforms, deficiencies and missing 
elements (such as the lack of liability in case of an accident) based on nuclear 
waste and its environmental risk factor-analysis. The legality and legitimacy of 
the report subsequently was thrown into doubt. Additionally, the signatures of 
engineers in the report had been forged (Radikal 2015). The former Minister 
of Environment and Urban Planning of Turkey denied all of the allegations. 
The question of “how is it possible to ignore these forged signatures” became an 
important subject (Interview, Filiz Yavuz, August 4, 2016). 
There were seventeen lawsuits filed by several advocates in 2014. One 
interviewee, Green Party Lawyer Arif Ali Cangi, who was involved in these 
lawsuits stated that “this insufficient report (ÇED) was found unnecessary by the 
authorities when applying the report for decontamination of Gaziemir where 
nuclear waste was found” (Interview, Arif Ali Cangi, April 23, 2015). The nuclear 
waste is a crucial matter and it needs special attention. Even if all the measures 
by authorities are taken in advance, the report fails to address the environmental 
impacts of the nuclear reactors and gives no information about accident risks 
in the event of an earthquake. Also, as for accidents in general, no one knows 
who will take responsibility. According to the major Turkish environmental 
group TEMA, the report is not professional with respect to environmental issues 
given its disregard for any seismic or accident risk and waste management, as 
well as emergency protective action plans (TEMA 2014). Therefore, a number 
of demonstrations were organized by the anti-nuclear groups requesting an 
adequate review of the report. To this date, however, the objections of numerous 
citizens’ initiatives (such as the Ege Environment and Culture Platform and 
Sinop’s Friends of the Environment Group) against the ÇED report have been 
ignored by the Turkish authorities.
An additional reason to doubt the seriousness of the environmental impact 
report is that Greenpeace Mediterranean published pictures of construction in 
2014. The construction of the first NPP had therefore started before the approval 
of the ÇED report. That is to say that construction had started without proper 
authorization and having a construction license. In this way the standard legal 
procedure was ignored. This contested report has contributed significantly to 
transforming Turkey’s nuclear struggle at least in part into a legal battle. In 
addition to the underlying risk and dissatisfaction associated with the project, 
questions over the legality of the government’s reporting on it has become a 
central source of grievance.
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Opposition to the Akkuyu Project for Political Reasons
Since the 2010 agreement with Russia, the Akkuyu process has been more 
politicized through focusing on the rhetoric of “development” by means of 
technology and economy (Interview, Fikret Ataman, March 5, 2016). The nuclear 
power issue in Turkey today is a technical necessity in the eyes of proponents, 
whereas opponents consider it a “political choice.” The government makes 
use of arguments that shape public perception on behalf of development such 
as increased employment, independence, advanced technology, and a newly 
developed Turkey, etc. By building the tools of development with profit-driven 
outcomes such as economic growth and scientific progress, modern societies 
are creating their own threat through producing new forms of risks (Beck 1999 
as cited by Jarvis 2007). For the case of Akkuyu, with economy-oriented policy-
making and national prestige considerations hanging over energy production, 
the nuclear issue in Turkey is more politicized than ever. The techno-economic 
progress and nuclear decision-making culture, which is committed to the 
country’s development and further economic success, is pushing acceptance of 
nuclear energy through a hegemony of experts and political actors.
Nuclear power is a centralized power source in both a physical and political 
sense. It allows a small number of scientific, political, and economic elites to 
make key decisions about energy. It is not surprising that governments, nuclear 
engineers, and scientists are in favor of nuclear energy in technical terms. 
Through having control over technical resources, Turkey’s nuclear debate has 
Figure 1. Image from Greenpeace Mediterranean Showing Unlicensed Construction of the 
Nuclear Power Plant in 2014
Source: Greenpeace (2014a)
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created an antipathy toward “nuclear technologies.” In the eyes of anti-nuclear 
activists, technocratic nuclear decisions are necessarily “uninspiring” and 
“undesirable” ones. In this view of large-scale technologies as well as technology-
friendly economic growth, it is believed that “zero risk does not exist” even if 
using the highest forms technology, as proved by Fukushima (Greenpeace 2014a).
According to the TAEK, one of the driving forces for addressing security 
concerns and advancing a domestic nuclear infrastructure is to enhance the 
use of products of nuclear technology by acquiring it for the benefit of Turkey. 
Anti-nuclear activists reject this argument, however, asserting instead that this 
technically-oriented approach to future national well-being causes the perceived 
erosion of democracy by increasing political ignorance. In respect to the anti-
nuclear claim, nuclear decision-makers are sacrificing human life for economic 
benefits (Interview, Filiz Yavuz, March 6, 2016).  
Along with the relationship between technocratic decisions underlying risk 
factors, there is also a question of democracy for the opponents of the Akkuyu 
project. The non-democratic structure of Turkish policy-making, with its top-
down structure, is based on political repression, exclusion, non-integration, and 
division between authoritative politicians and the electorate. Turkish democracy’s 
deficiency in affecting the nuclear decision is illustrated by the government’s 
opponents using the following arguments.
First, the responsible bodies do not consider providing sufficiently 
systematic and holistic information to public. The nuclear vendors do not share 
any of the public’s concerns. They refuse to answer any question associated with 
the disadvantageous, dangerous, or risky parts of the project. The attitude of the 
Public Information Center in Mersin (Interview in situ, February 24, 2016), for 
example, was one of certainty in all aspects of the project, denying all scientific 
explanations inconsistent with their point of view, and responding to any contrary 
findings and allegations through praising the nuclear project. This approach does 
not give any space for a questioner to evaluate the project further. Even the ÇED 
report portrayed the project as essential to the contemporary Turkish pursuit of 
wellbeing, regardless of an uncompleted and technically undetailed assessment, 
which was elaborated hastily without considering several crucial issues for 
the current and future nuclear posture. This does not enable the populace to 
ensure their constitutional rights to live in a healthy and balanced environment 
(Interview, Filiz Yavuz, March 6, 2016).
Second, there is neither public participation in nor democratic consultation 
with the government. In other words, there is a lack of mutual engagement 
between the local community and energy policy-makers. Stronger involvement 
of civil society requires greater inclusion of civil society in the decision-
making process (Netzer 2011, 9). In the case of Turkey in the energy policy 
implementation phase, public participation in a decision, which concerns all 
citizens, is virtually non-existent (Interview, Sebahat Arslan, February 24, 2016). 
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No one has consulted the public during the decision-making or implementation 
phases to obtain their opinion. On these grounds, dissatisfaction over the lack of 
democratic consultation is a crucial factor in opposition to the nuclear issue. 
Excluding public preferences via disconnection and lack of communication 
and ignoring public fears of the process has eroded public sympathy and 
created dissatisfaction over nuclear energy. The anti-nuclear groups thus accuse 
responsible bodies of avoiding public scrutiny during the entire process to employ 
nuclear energy. This prevents the achievement of a greater public consensus and 
heightens the division between civil society and the nuclear decision-makers.
The “why-not-a-referendum” approach advocated by opponents has also 
been ignored. According to a recent survey taken by Greenpeace Mediterranean 
following the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 64 percent of respondents stated 
that they would vote “no” in a possible referendum on having NPPs in Turkey, 
and more than 86 percent stated that they did not want to live near an NPP. No 
attempt has been made by public authorities to assess public opinion. Turkey’s 
nuclear future is merely at the mercy of policy-makers (Interview, Melda 
Keskin, July 30, 2016). Opponents believe it is essential to obtain public consent 
considering “nuclearization” is a crucial issue beyond any technological or 
economic matter. More generally, the conjunction between growing criticism and 
opposition to the nuclear project and citizen preference need to be taken into 
account to produce a widely-accepted consensus.
Third, attempts by civil society organizations to organize public protests 
have been suppressed, sometimes violently. Greenpeace’s intervention at the 
first Istanbul Nuclear Power Plants Summit in 2014 supported by the Turkish 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources was suppressed. Nine Greenpeace 
activists were detained by the police after hoisting a banner that said “Nuclear 
Disaster Starts Here.” Participants of this summit included the license holders of 
Akkuyu and Sinop NPPs, top-level representatives from the Republic of Turkey’s 
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, nuclear suppliers, consultants, public 
authorities, and Turkish manufacturers willing to invest in nuclear energy. NGO 
or trade union representatives were not invited. This was not difficult to predict 
considering government representatives in the energy sector were turning a blind 
eye to public concern.
There is one more issue pertaining to the nature of the Akkuyu project. The 
Akkuyu Information Center located in Mersin informs school groups (elementary, 
middle, and high school) and teachers about nuclear energy and nuclear 
technology, and the facilities that produce and use it. Nuclear energy is presented 
as unambiguously good and the sole option for Turkey’s energy future. Looking 
at this issue from the Greenpeace perspective, this has been considered nuclear 
propaganda given that the reality surrounding nuclear energy in education is 
not objective, and they argue it should be based on scientific truth (Greenpeace 
2015). Explaining nuclear energy and technology to children without its historical 
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context, including Chernobyl and Fukushima, and especially Akkuyu which has 
been such a contested issue, was an issue of the utmost importance to Greenpeace 
in 2015. To protest this, they launched an online signature campaign that reached 
more than 23,000 people by July 2016. The main goal of the campaign is to cancel 
the curriculum in nuclear energy provided by the Ministry of National Education. 
As also affirmed by the NKP’s current spokesperson Erkan Demir, the NKP 
Mersin sent a petition to the Ministry of National Education’s branch in Mersin 
which requested an investigation into the background of the nuclear project and 
also demanded organization of panels on nuclear alternatives such as wind and 
solar energy for students in Mersin. However, these calls were rejected by the 
authorities, who replied that the necessary information about nuclear energy is 
given by teachers at school (Interview, Erkan Demir, February 24, 2016).
Such one-sided explanations through nuclear advertising to induce people 
to agree with nuclear energy development and particularly the Akkuyu project 
is seen as a violation of educational rights, and has become one of the grievances 
of the Turkish anti-nuclear groups who claim that this is an unprofessional way 
for disseminating scientific information. Lack of scientific and objective analysis 
of nuclear energy at schools neither stimulates the sharing of information in an 
appropriate way nor promotes the use of national renewable energy sources and 
energy efficiency technologies.
Fourth, another argument shaping a visible stance toward the project 
consists of looking abroad and noting which countries are still pursuing nuclear 
energy, and which have abandoned it in the wake of Fukushima. Anti-nuclear 
activists put forward the claim that no democracy has continued to pursue 
nuclear energy. Instead, democratic countries have phased it out as outdated and 
inferior to other viable alternatives. Only undemocratic ones such as China and 
Saudi Arabia continue to build NPPs (Interview, Cenk Levi, July 15, 2016). This 
leads to the question of why Turkey is seeking to acquire nuclear energy when the 
democratic world is giving it up.
Last but importantly not least, looking at other political parties, it is fair to 
say that any decision over the Akkuyu NPP in Turkey by the current pro-nuclear 
government is political rather than raw ideology. Opposing Akkuyu would be 
framed as being against Turkey’s neoliberal policies for economic growth, Russia’s 
privilege, the consequences of the Fukushima Disaster, and more. Therefore, 
opposition from parties is very limited to leftist and environmentalist parties such 
as the Turkey Social Democratic Party (CHP), the Greens, and the Left Party of 
the Future (Yesiller Partisi). This weak opposition is based around a few fierce 
activist parliamentarians in Mersin from these opposition parties, such as Aytug 
Atici and Huseyin Camak, and representatives such as Sevil Turan. 
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Consequence-Based Explanation of Opposition to the Akkuyu 
Project in the Wake of Fukushima
Although all the Turkish anti-nuclear groups were born out of a struggle 
against the nuclear issue in Turkey, they all went beyond the subject that 
triggered their formation. Lessons from Fukushima strengthened opposition 
and made the situation more alarming for states with NPPs. The Fukushima 
Daiichi nuclear accident was a turning point for Turkish citizens to question 
the necessity of nuclear power not only in Turkey but also anywhere in the 
world. The accident drew immediate public attention in 2011 together with the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Chernobyl. Fukushima was an alert to assess nuclear 
technologies around the world and changed the interpretation of the nuclear 
question in Turkey. The reactors at Chernobyl belonged to the Soviet Union 
and used outdated technologies. Fukushima, on the other hand, was comprised 
of pioneering Japanese technology. The accident was a reason to continue the 
nuclear debate because it showed that an earthquake could destroy anything, even 
NPPs using the best technologies (Interview, Umit Sahin, July 15, 2016). More 
generally, after Fukushima, people became less ambivalent over nuclearization 
and started to question even the advanced Japanese technology, which, until then, 
had a great reputation in Turkey. Many groups claimed that “even Japan, which 
is a leading country with its eminent technology and equipment, has failed. How 
can we trust the Russian state-owned company Rosatom, which has a bad image 
due to the Chernobyl disaster?”
The nuclear debate continued fiercely and became more crucial with this 
strong argument. Fukushima has given legitimacy to public skepticism of 
any NPP. After Fukushima, anti-nuclear groups in Turkey have become more 
ambitious in organizing mass political mobilization around a concrete argument 
that “any nuclear reactors can fail as nuclear power is fundamentally unsafe.” 
They spoke more than ever, arguing that this accident proved that an accident 
can happen anywhere in the world regardless of sophisticated technology. They 
used this opportunity to relaunch denunciation campaigns about nuclear power 
to derail the establishment of the Akkuyu NPP. For example, for the members 
of NKP Mersin, the slogan after Fukushima became “don’t let Akkuyu become 
Fukushima!”
Erdogan’s answer to public dissent after Fukushima largely avoided the 
specific risks posed by nuclear power and focused instead of the inevitability of 
risks in all walks of life. Erdogan said “in that case, let’s not bring gas canisters 
to our homes, let’s not install natural gas, let’s not stream crude oil through our 
country.” Experts, activists, and NGOs protested the Prime Minister’s playing 
down of a tragic event and the crucial risks of nuclear power. In light of this 
attitude, it can be argued that if there was ever a nuclear accident, it would be 
swept under the carpet given the example of the biggest mine accident in the 
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history of Turkey at Soma in 2014. Erdogan’s response to this tragedy was to say 
that risks were normal and accidents would happen. In one of his speeches he 
remarked, “let’s please not pretend such incidents do not occur in mines,” and 
continued to say “these are ordinary developments. It is something like labor 
accidents in literature. This is part of the nature of this business…Security and 
health regulations had received a pass…Don’t protest, just pray.” One of the fears 
surrounding the Akkuyu project is centered on the government’s downplaying 
of “the right to life” through maintaining such discourses and nuclear ignorance. 
Anti-nuclear groups ask, “who will take responsibility in that case?” They believe 
that nothing is guaranteed and it is not appropriate to take such risks under these 
circumstances.
Alternative Engergy-Based Explanation of Opposition to the 
Akkuyu Project
 
A different approach to the nuclear question is based on promoting a transition 
away from the Akkuyu nuclear project to renewable energies since Turkey has 
great potential to do so. The anti-nuclear movement claims that demanding 
possible safer alternatives to reliance on nuclear power in a sustainable way 
would be the best solution to ensure Turkey’s future energy supply. In this way, 
Turkey would become a self-sufficient country in energy, independent of Russia. 
Turkey has a very rich renewable energy potential, especially for wind, solar, 
Figure 2. “Don’t Let Akkuyu Become Fukushima”
Source:  Former Spokesperson for NKP Ms. Sabahat Aslan shared via email on February 24, 
2015
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and geothermal. A report prepared by Greenpeace with the European Union 
Renewable Energy Council demonstrates that Turkey can meet 85 percent of its 
electricity needs with renewables like wind, solar, and geothermal energies by 
2040 (Greenpeace 2014b).
The examination of nuclear energy created a “nuclear exit” in Germany 
(Ramana 2013, 67). After the Fukushima crisis, the German government 
formulated a “nuclear phase-out” policy and shut down seven reactors. They 
committed to an expansion of renewable energy sources by 2022. By doing so 
they strived to be a role model for other countries and remain an industrial 
powerhouse (Jahn and Korolczuk 2012). The model for Turkish anti-nuclear 
activists is Germany, where a strong civil society enabled anti-nuclear groups to 
take the initiative after Fukushima and convince the government to put forward 
a plan to phase out nuclear power and focus more on renewable energy policies. 
Considering Turkey’s solar capacity and geographical position (sunshine for 300 
days), it is perfectly capable of generating solar energy. Groups often address 
this issue thorough the concrete example of Germany, asking “why not Turkey?” 
(Interview, Seyfettin Atar, February 24, 2016).
Another advantage of renewable energy sources, from the point of view 
of these groups, is that they do not include any international organization 
or business, nor do they require any extensive security. They are innocuous 
compared to NPPs which require a review of their compatibility given security 
concerns. Moreover, renewable energies are less expensive than nuclear power. 
According to the subsidy program introduced by The Usage of Renewable Energy 
Sources for Electric Energy Generation for Turkey in 2010, licensed suppliers 
with a “Renewable Energy Supply Document” are guaranteed the following prices 
per kWh for a ten year period: wind energy at USD 7.3 cents, geothermal energy 
at USD 10.5 cents, and solar energy at USD 13.3 cents (Kumbaroğlu 2012, 19). 
When comparing renewable energy subsidies with Akkuyu (USD 12.35 cents per 
kWh in the first fifteen years) including fuel, operations, management, as well 
as waste management and decommissioning, it can be said that the comparative 
cost of nuclear energy will be very high (Gürbüz 2012). 
Besides, in the aftermath of any possible accident, people might be obliged 
to pay an “emergency disaster tax” to remedy the situation. After Fukushima, the 
Japanese government planned to impose such a tax to pay for damage caused by 
the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. According to my interviews, it is anticipated that the 
public will be obliged to pay a nuclear tax if an accident takes place.
The question of “why is there no attempt to shift to localized, renewable 
energy options, focus on sustainable energy policies, and encourage investments 
in solar, wind, and hydro energy to reduce foreign dependency” has led dissidents 
to frame this issue as an irrational one since the beginning. In this respect, 
Greenpeace (2010) proposed a solution by comparing two well-developed regions 
with Akkuyu-Buyukeceli and the Sinop Inceburun site on the Black Sea through 
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a historical perspective. The Alacatı and Bozcaada regions in the west of Turkey 
have become socio-economically developed after investing in wind and solar 
energy. They became notable places in terms of tourism and organic agriculture 
and have proven that sustainable energy alternatives are possible. The report 
concludes that there has been no such initiative in either Akkuyu-Buyukeceli or 
Sinop despite their solar and wind capacity as well as potential for tourism. This 
is due to the fact that these regions have a nuclear shadow of uncertainty hanging 
over them to the detriment of agriculture and tourism. To make their arguments 
accessible to the local population, Greenpeace volunteers installed a set of solar 
panels on the mosque in Büyükeçeli in 2010 to demonstrate how renewable 
energy could be a viable alternative to the proposed nuclear project. The solar 
energy has been meeting the power needs of the entire mosque since then. By 
demonstrating these tangible solutions and findings, especially in the aftermath 
of Chernobyl and Fukushima, Greenpeace seeks to make the case that Turkey 
does not need to go nuclear.
In light of all these findings, anti-nuclear groups argue that going nuclear is 
irrational when considering Turkey’s capacity. There is no clear indication that 
this project is motivated by finding a real solution to energy production. Taking 
renewable alternatives into account as safer and more affordable, they argue that 
“Turkey does not need nuclear energy” as the country is not a resource-poor 
country incapable of covering its energy demand. As for the unified opposition 
discourse, the need for Turkey is an efficient energy revolution without making 
“energy need” a matter of trade and national prestige. The questions shaping their 
arguments on renewables versus nuclear remain: “why is Turkey not ensuring 
maximum use of renewable energy alternatives” and “why does Turkey not invest 
in energy alternatives since the Mediterranean Sea is very rich in terms of solar 
energy?”
Conclusion
The objections and opposition to nuclear development in Turkey have their own 
history dating back to the 1970s, which was seen as an emblematic milestone 
in the fight for environmental justice in Turkey. Starting with the agreement 
with Russia in 2010 to build the first NPP, Turkey’s anti-nuclear struggle re-
gained momentum. Since then, opponents of the project have brought to light 
its controversial nature with several distinct arguments. The findings show 
that perceptions of unsophisticated safety and security measures, problematic 
conditions related to potential seismic activity, and doubts surrounding national 
security allow the project to be framed as risky. The extreme cost, insufficient 
information on and legality of waste disposal, and administrative improperness 
form the core of the aggravated grievances. Ignoring public preference, the 
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non-democratic structure of the decision-making process, and the lack of 
consultation and communication have generated a frame for a fiery political 
debate. Not only this, opposition groups argue that no lesson has been learned 
from the Fukushima accident since no attempt has been made to revert from 
this conflictual and contested construction of nuclear power plants to a more 
desirable focus on the divergent renewable options.
The persistence of the unanswered questions (such as who would be liable 
for a nuclear accident) posed by the anti-nuclear groups as well as concerned 
civilians are the principal explanations for the uncertainties and an unpredictable 
future surrounding the project. These explanations provide a root in constructing 
and framing it as an “unsatisfactory, irrational, unsupportable, unfavorable, 
flawed, unwanted, unsympathetic, stay-away-project, skeptical, and risky” 
nuclear project by the activists, environmentalists, nuclear opponents, civil 
society organizations, and others who are completely against the project itself 
or commercial use of nuclear energy regardless of its intrinsic elements. These 
people also defined this dissonance as a “nuclear conflict or threat” through 
doubting all aspects of the project. 
From the beginning, they portray “drivers of any nuclear program” as a 
catastrophic means of producing energy and frame their futuristic scenarios 
on the Akkuyu project as an “unhappily-ever after” one. After the agreement 
with Russia and the Fukushima accident, any nuclear project is continually 
painted as a problematic for them. Distrust in the unsafe nature of Rosatom and 
inexperience and misgivings in Turkey’s infrastructure as a newcomer shape 
this picture for Akkuyu. At the same time, the government’s commitment to the 
project also remains intact. Therefore, Turkey’s intractable nuclear puzzle and 
love-hate relationship with the nuclear resurgence can be predicated and framed 
as an unresolved Gordian knot that will not seemingly be cut in the near future. 
Appendix: List of Interviewees
Although all of the interviewees listed below are not cited directly in this article, 
discussions with all of them helped frame the arguments laid out here.
Sebahat Arslan (former NKP spokesperson, February 24, 2016, Mersin)
Seyfettin Atar (Head of the Chamber of the Electric Engineering, February 24, 
2016, Mersin)
Erkan Demir (current NKP spokesperson, February 24, 2016, Mersin)
Fikret Adaman (Professor at Bogazici University, March 5, 2016, Istanbul)
Filiz Yavuz (Author and activist, March 6, 2016, Istanbul; Second Interview on 
August 4, 2016 via email)
Ümit Şahin (Istanbul Policy Center, March 6, 2016, Istanbul)
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Pinar Demircan (Project Manager at nükleersiz.org, March 7, 2016, Istanbul)
Hayrettin Kılıç (Nuclear physicist, peace activist and environmentalist, April 16, 
2016, via email)
Melda Keskin (Former Coordinator of Greenpeace’ Energy Campaign, via email 
on April 18, 2016, and in person on July 30, 2016)
Arif Künar (energy expert and activist, April 21, 2016, via email)
Aytuğ Atıcı (parliamentarian and anti-nuclear activist, May 2, 2016, via email)
Cenk Levi (former energy campaigner of Greenpeace, July 15, 2016, via Skype)
Arif Ali Cangı (lawyer for the Greens and the Left Party of the Future, 
independent activist, August 12, 2016, via email)
Özgür Gürbüz (activist and blogger, August 4, 2016, via email)
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